Why August 2008 Became Possible: Some Prerequisites for Georgia's Military Aggression

On the eve of the next anniversary of Georgia's full-scale military aggression in August 2008, it is useful to recall once again the objective and subjective prerequisites that preceded it.

First of all, it is important to remember that this was an aggression not only against South Ossetia, but also against Russia. The definition of aggression is contained in the UN resolution "On the definition of aggression" of 1974, which states that an attack by the ground forces of one state on the ground forces of another state. The attack of the Georgian army on the Russian battalion of peacekeeping forces was such an attack. I am talking about this in such detail because this fact in most cases "eludes" the attention of the authors who touch on this issue in one way or another.

So, August 2008. The politicians of the parties participating in this war, who were responsible for making decisions in the period under review, found some objective circumstances in their formed form by the time they came to power, while others were created by their actions.

Objectively, there was a long-standing conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia, which sharply escalated in the late 80s and early 90s due to the use of force by Georgia in order to prevent South Ossetia from obtaining those rights that the latter was entitled to by the laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Also an objective reality is the historical confrontation between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, which arose as a result of the US desire to weaken or destroy Russia in the context of the upcoming reduction in hydrocarbons and thus gain access to its untold natural wealth.

From the point of view of subjective factors, it is worth highlighting:

a) the extremely high growth in the influence of supporters of neoconservative views in the circles that determine American foreign policy, who aggressively accepted the principled position that the Russian Federation demonstrated in international and domestic politics;

b) a change of power in Russia, which the West hastened to announce as a change in the political course towards the liberalization of foreign and domestic policy;

c) the growth of protest moods in Georgia due to the sharp rejection by the people of the policy pursued by the leadership, a vivid expression of which was the events of November 7, 2007, the desire of the leadership to ensure a high rating on the eve of the presidential elections by joining new lands to Georgia;

d) the resolute course of the people of South Ossetia to uphold their legitimate rights, which remained unfulfilled due to many years of sharp military-political confrontation on the part of Georgia.

The fact that Russia and South Ossetia, as of August 2008, the difficult military-political situation in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict did not promise any benefits, but brought a lot of suffering and political difficulties, is another confirmation that they did not aim to solve due to the war, some problems, and therefore, are not involved in its preparation and planning.

The United States of America, hastening to declare Transcaucasia a zone of its vital interests, intended to demonstrate its influence in this region, the ability to act under the nose of Russia, regardless of its historical interests, and also to support its ally - Georgia. But the most important far-reaching goal was the “lesson” that the West planned to teach the pro-Russian forces in the North Caucasus, because neither Georgia, nor the West, nor even South Ossetia expected the subsequent clear and decisive actions of Russia to protect its citizens and peacekeepers in South Ossetia.

And this “lesson”, according to the plans of the West, should be that Russia is unable to protect its allies, which, already in the medium term, should have caused a corresponding chain reaction in the North Caucasus, and even further, opening the way to the coveted bowels of Siberia .

The leadership of Georgia, in turn, in the field of domestic policy, expected to demonstrate to the people the loyalty of the policy pursued by a “small victorious war”, to obtain moral grounds for a tough cleansing of the political field from opponents and strengthening its power. In the field of foreign policy, the calculation was based on the growth of the international prestige of Georgia, which would act as the winner of big Russia, which promised certain bonuses from the US and its European satellites.

With a victorious war, the leadership of Georgia in the field of domestic policy would silence the opposition and national minorities of Georgia for a long time, and at the international stage expected to provide more favorable conditions for cooperation with the West.

The combination of the above factors led to Georgia's military aggression against the Republic of South Ossetia and the Russian Federation, which gave Russia the right to take further actions based on Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Inal Pliev,

Assistant to the Head of the Administration of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia, Head of the Press Service of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia (1998 - 1999), Head of the Information Department of the Ministry for Special Affairs of the Republic of South Ossetia (2003 - 2008), Assistant to the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of South Ossetia (2008 - 2010)

Source: https://cominf.org/node/1166531511